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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
GARY M. EDWARDS,
Petitioner,
v.
DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT
SECURITY,

Case No. 920793-CA
Priority No. 7

Respondent.
REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONER

DETAIL OF ARGUMENT
The facts which gave rise to the case before the Court are
simple and straightforward; however, the bizarre way they were
interpreted made the case complex.

Neither Petitioner's counsel

nor the reviewing/judicial parties understood or made an attempt to
understand the actual circumstances and events.
unemployed

March

20,

1991,

having

worked

Petitioner was
for

Air

System

Mechanical/Utah Air Sales but left when his employer refused to pay
him his earned commissions.

Although eligible for benefits from

that date according to the State Industrial Commission guidelines
and at the direction of state officials, Petitioner applied for
unemployment benefits on April 3, 1991. Benefits were finally paid
commencing May 4, 1991, and payment continued through August 31,
1991.

On

September

1,
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he

accepted

employment

with

Mountainwest (Cox) and continued working for that employer until

January 19 9 2 Mountainwest employer refused to pay him his earned
commissions• When Petitioner demanded payment Mountainwest, by Mr.
Cox threatened Petitioner verbally and in writing; (Petitioner's
Brief Addendum 2); called the Department of Employment Security in
early March 1992, "and turned in Petitioner." When Petitioner's
attorney asked Mr. Cox at the initial hearing June 22, 19 9 2 whether
in fact he owed the Petitioner money, had refused to pay, took out
bankruptcy to avoid payment and then turned Petitioner in to Job
Service Mr. Cox answered in the affirmative

(Transcript not

available)«,
Under the regulations, when a complaining witness has a
pertinent interest in his complaint, his testimony is not to be
given weight.

Cox

Yet, he was the primary witness for the respondent.

filed

for bankruptcy

in March

1992

scheduling

the

Petitioner as an ordinary unsecured creditor, and appeared in
Court.

This made the complaining witness the only priority

claimant in the bankruptcy as the sole employee of Mountainwest.
After his investigation, Mr. Warner alleged fraud and demanded
payment

from

requested

a

Petitioner
hearing.

of double
In

that

the benefit.
hearing,

Petitioner

conducted

by

Investigator/Hearing Officer Warner, he affirmed that Petitioner
had indeed defrauded the Respondent.

Upon appeal, November 3,

1992, ALJ Hynek upheld Officer Warner, and the Board upheld the
ALJ.

The

Respondent

failed

to

carry

the

burden

of

proof

requirements sufficient to prove that Petitioner had been employed,

2

in what capacity, and for what period of time. The evidence relied
upon was the testimony of the complaining employer, the "employment
contract," excerpts from the testimony of the hearing officer and
agency representative, citing only the claim cards as evidence of
fraud, wherein Petitioner had failed to report his work or earnings
for the period in question.

Significantly in the later hearing,

the ALJ added to that earlier ruling and found that "even if he had
not worked, he could have worked."
Respondent claims there was no evidence that the claim against
Petitioner's previous employer was material to the case at hand.
Petitioner in attempting to provide such written evidence attempted
to obtain the notes and formal disposition

from that trial;

however, was informed the judge had retired and only an abstract
was available.
Brief.

The abstract was provided with the Petitioner's

Two points are material:

(a) The employer had failed and refused to pay and the Court
determined

that

notwithstanding

that

tax

withholding,

contributions to the State Unemployment Fund for payments for the
wages paid, that a "partnership" existed and that Petitioner was
not an employee and his back wages were forfeit; a finding which
was upheld on appeal.

When this information was provided to Job

Service, it was their determination that Petitioner was an employee
and was eligible for unemployment benefits (though it appears on
this latest review of the documents that he was actually shorted
benefits which should have been paid from March 20, not April
29th).

What is significant to the case at bar is that the
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outstanding bids were the property of the Petitioner and these
accounts were assigned to Cox against which Cox eventually loaned
money to Petitioner.
(b)

At the second Circuit Court (appeal) hearing, Mr. Cox

appeared as a witness for the defendant

(Petitioner's Brief,

Addendum 1) which is certainly evidence there was an apparent
conspiracy

between

two disgruntled

individuals

who had

both

determined a way to cheat Petitioner out of his earnings.
Respondent states the bankruptcy proceedings were for unpaid
commissions which were not material to the instant case.

The

materiality is obvious, to wit:
a) Cox suggested and agreed and did, in fact, loan Petitioner
money

as

inducement

Petitioner's

to

acquire

the

clients; the financial

outstanding

transactions

bids

from

between

the

parties are consistent with the transactions and a far more
reasonable explanation than the findings of the Respondent both for
the time period of the instant case (R. 160), and the subsequent
period through January, 1992.
b) Mr. Cox under oath testified to the Bankruptcy Court that
the petitioner was not an employee, merely an unsecured creditor.

c)

Mr. Cox did not report the Petitioner as an employee on

his quarterly unemployment forms.
d)

Mr. Cox did not provide the Petitioner with either a W-2

form, a 109 9 form, or in any manner acknowledge that there were any
payments (earnings) reportable to any agency, including Internal
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Revenue Service, made to petitioner for all of 1991.
e) That Respondent questions the materiality stating that the
compensation was earned subsequent to the period at issue is
absurd.

Respondent totally ignores that compensation allegedly

paid during the period in question was actually earned prior to
Petitioner's association with the complaining witness; Respondent
can't have it both ways.
The Respondent's failure to establish the facts and their
erroneous decisions thereon are unequivocally errors requiring
review by this Court.
POINT I.
THE RESPONDENT FAILED TO PROVE THAT CLAIMANT HAD WORK AND
EARNINGS BEGINNING APRIL 29, 1991 THROUGH AUGUST 31, 1991
Respondent alleges that Petitioner worked for the time period
noted supported by substantial evidence including Petitioner's
testimony.

The contract which was dated April 29, 1991 was a

document by which Petitioner who had been cheated by the previous
employer

hoped

Mountainwest.

to

establish

credibility

for

Cox

d.b.a.

It was for a short period of time (two months), to

provide compensation when, as, and if his outstanding bids were
reduced to contract, and to check out the viability of the bids and
establish performance or pay requirements.

It never became an

operational agreement between the parties.
Respondent argues the contract allows for up to a year and a
half to get the accounts in order before Petitioner can get paid,
yet avers that the contract was drafted to provide for advances.
Cox

paid

no

advances

or

draws
5

or

commissions

however,

characterized, until June 7, 1991.

Petitioner is quoted as

allowing up a year and a half to effect payment on a bid, yet
Respondent suggests that it took only five weeks to earn his first
commission.

No evidence in the record establishes June 7, 1991

payment as a commission.

Respondent

refers to Petitioner's

testimony (R. 118, paragraphs 10 and 11 and R. 120-121) as evidence
that he was working on sales during this period of time.

This

testimony is that Petitioner was checking occasionally on the
status of outstanding bids he had "brought to the table" with his
own clients, not Mountainwest's nor new clients initiated while
associated with Mountainwest.

Petitioner was calling his own

clients at intervals checking on contracts. "I was in contact with
a few of the bigger companies in town looking for employment. .
.something

stable."

Petitioner was indeed

looking

for work

throughout the period of time he collected unemployment benefits.
The fact that Petitioner continued

to diligently

search for

employment has never been contested by Respondent.
Respondent seeks to justify the dearth of facts to support
findings that even if Petitioner didn't work for the alleged
employer, he could have and if he didn't when he could have, he
would have been ineligible for benefits anyway.

The complaining

witness's self-serving testimony is here evident in terms of
Respondent's

conclusions.

If Witness

Cox

can

establish

by

testimony in Bankruptcy Court that Petitioner was not an employee
Cox's position as an employee takes priority over a general
unsecured creditor and Cox's "salary" comes ahead of payments from
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Petitioner's residual.
Respondent

that

If he can at the same time convince the

Petitioner was

an

employee who

fraudulently

obtained benefits as an employee, he is not debited with the
benefits which would have been due Petitioner.

Respondent is in

the case at bar allowing the complaining witness to perpetrate a
fraud on the lower courts, and arguing that somehow Petitioner is
the perpetrator rather than the victim.
against the Petitioner's word.

Thus we have Cox's word

The Petitioner states Cox did not

offer him a job, Cox says he did.

Under the rules of conflicting

evidence, the whole record test must be applied which requires that
the findings must be supported by substantial evidence, Utah Code
Annotated, Sections 63-46(b)(17). Respondent was charged to review
all of the evidence, yet failed to discern the truth.
Under Utah Code Annotated, Sections 35-1-30, it is noted a
full and complete record shall be kept of all proceedings and
transcription, when requested, shall be provided.

Sections 35-4-

10(e) states...all testimony at any hearing upon a disputed matter
shall be reported but need not be transcribed unless the disputed
matter is appealed. No transcript has been provided for the first,
and as it has developed, the decisive hearing, the results of which
all subsequent reviewers upheld. The whole record not having been
made available, this procedural flaw is fatal.
As to whether "he could have worked," the law is clear under
Utah Code Annotated, Sections 35-4-5(c)(1) and (2) and (2)(ii) that
in determining whether or not work is suitable, one must take into
consideration prior earnings, the wages for similar work in the
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locality and whether wages, hours, or other conditions of the work
offered are substantially less favorable to the individual than
those prevailing for similar work; to suggest that the Petitioner
in this case accepted full-time work for no pay, or even commission
only in this locality for similar work is ludicrous.

Petitioner

was never advised by Respondent that witnesses to substantiate his
case could have attended all hearings in violation of his rights
under the law (U.S. Constitution, Amendment V and XIV); with
witnesses, he could have proven

to the department

that the

standards for such work are well established, none of which require
commission only and that the policy of the department vis a vis
residual commissions is well established, the real intent and
purpose of the "employment contract" and his supportive proof in
his efforts to find employment with a stable employer.
Respondent's incorporates a legal opinion in the Olof Nelson
Construction Co. v. Industrial Commission, 121 Utah 525, 243, P.2d
951 (1952) citing. This case has no bearing on the instant case as
Petitioner was not on strike, diligently sought employment, did not
refuse work and obscured no material information on his claim
cards.
In Johnson v. Department of Emp. Sec, 782 P.2d 965 (Utah Ct.
App. 1989), the Respondent's application of law to its factual
findings exceeds the bounds of reasonableness and rationality.
In Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63 (Utah Ct.
App.1989), under the "whole record test," a court must consider not
only the evidence supporting the board's factual findings but also
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the evidence that fairly detracts from the weight of the board's
evidence.

The Respondent has not fulfilled its directed lawful

responsibilities.

As

a

direct

result

of

the

Respondent's

procedural flaws, reliance on questionable evidence, and failure to
review the whole record sufficient to show that despite the
supporting facts and in light of the conflicting or contradictory
evidence, the findings are and cannot be supported by substantial
evidence.

Petitioner's rights were unquestionably violated under

the equal protection clause of the XlVth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution.
POINT II.
RESPONDENT FAILED TO PROVE THAT CLAIMANT KNOWINGLY AND
WILLFULLY WITHHELD INFORMATION REGARDING WORK AND
EARNINGS TO RECEIVE BENEFITS TO WHICH HE WAS NOT
ENTITLED.
Petitioner applied for work at Mountainwest which he fully
disclosed to Respondent (R. 3) noting the date as April 3, 1991,
Contact," Mark", How contacted: "in person," result:

"?" Mr. Cox

did not offer Petitioner a job, however, on his testimony upon
which

Respondent

relied,

he

repeatedly

states

he

employed

Petitioner on a full-time basis on a commission-only arrangement.
No credible evidence other than the tainted testimony of the selfserving and complaining witness was provided.
desperately

looking

for

business,

recognized

Mr. Cox was
Petitioner's

reputation and clientele, and was very interested in obtaining
Petitioner's clients. Petitioner assigned certain contracts to Cox
and Cox would pay a commission on the goods or services when the
contracts were funded.

The written agreement for a two month
9

period was not a contract for employment.

Cox's testimony in

Bankruptcy Court and his evasiveness in testimony in Respondent's
recorded hearing when pressed for dates and times established this.
Witnesses could have been called to provide evidence to support the
truth (see discussion Page 11, Paragraph 1 of this Reply Brief).
Petitioner determined that he would contact on his own time
his own clients, refer one or two to Cox and observe Cox's ability
to perform, again affirming the short term agreement, alleged as a
two month employment agreement by Respondent and Cox's willingness
and ability to pay Petitioner.
The Respondent interpreted that the sales were closed while
Petitioner was working for Mountainwest and not while he was
working for the other employers, stating "if the sales had been
closed while working for the others employers, the commissions
would have been due from those employers." The Petitioner concurs;
however, the former employer did not pay so Petitioner negotiated
a deal initiated by Cox to loan funds against those commissions to
allow Petitioner the "expenses" of clarifying and securing the bids
then outstanding.

Cox loaned Petitioner approximately

pursuant to this agreement.

$2900

Petitioner's residual clients (R.158)

contacted include, but were not limited to:

Bountiful Manor,

Freebairn, Park City Racquet Club, Smoot, Springwood, Hermies,
Construction Advisors, Devco, Park City Corp., and Kelly Pipe.
Letters

from

three

of

these

clients

were

provided

in

the

Petitioner's Brief, Addenda 5, 6 and 7, establishing that the
initial

sale

was

made

(15

February

10

1991, and

early

1991,

respectively) prior

to

the dates

of

Petitioner's

claim

for

benefits.
No reliable evidence is in the record or findings as to the
nature of the obligations giving rise to the payments or their
purpose except for the testimony and Affidavit of Petitioner.
Respondent's attempt to correlate the dates and payments were not
supported or supportable by the evidence.

Petitioner testified

that the loans were draws, however characterized, and were against
residual accounts of commission earned by Petitioner prior to his
association with Cox.

No evidence by Respondent sets forth any

reasonable conclusions to the contrary.
All of the facts were outlined in Petitioner's Affidavit (R.
140-147) which was ignored by the Board of Review.
Respondent quotes material from the Job Service guide relating
to work and earnings; petitioner reaffirms he did not work and had
no earnings, therefore he did not report any. He did not knowingly
withhold any information.
Hypothetically, even if the payments to Petitioner could have
possibly been characterized as earned income, there were clearly no
earnings for April or May and no draws (and no time spent), with
the first services provided by Cox to Petitioner's clients in June
which would not have been due or paid until at least July and would
not have been earned under the terms of the alleged contract until
the invoices were paid which would have been August or September on
the June services; September/October
October/November on August's services.
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on July's services, and
Petitioner's attorney

pointed out that even if one accepted Respondent's position,
Petitioner still had no earnings for April, May or June, and then
was paid for 10 out of 15 weeks; he then provided a model for an
alternative review of benefits juxtaposed to earnings under the
rules, all of which was ignored by ALJ Hynek, and the Board.
Respondent repeatedly acknowledges that it had the burden of
proof

noting

there

must

be

a

willful

misrepresentation

or

concealment of information for the purpose of obtaining benefits,
then further stating that there was an absence of an admission or
direct proof of intent to defraud.

The Board acknowledged that

Petitioner had complied with all the rules, Utah Code Annotated,
Section 35-4-4-(a), had indeed applied for work at various places,
Section 35-4-4(b), was available for work during each and every
week in which he made a claim for benefits, Section 35-4-4(c), then
apparently based their findings wholly on the testimony of the
complaining

witness.

Yet, the

conclusions

were

completely

inconsistent with their findings.
POINT III.
PETITIONER SET FORTH RESPONDENT'S ERRORS IN FINDINGS OF
FACT, LAW, EVIDENCE AND JUDGMENT WHEREIN RESPONDENT
RELIED ON A PREJUDICED WITNESS, ABUSED JUDICIAL POWERS,
AND IGNORED COLLATERAL ACTIONS OF OTHER COURTS.
The Constitution of the United States and of the State of Utah
note all men have the inherent and inalienable right to enjoy and
defend their liberties, protest wrongs and petition for redress of
grievances, nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty
or property without due process of law, nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of laws.
12

Utah Code

Annotated, Sections 35-4-10(c) charge . . . each decision of an
administrative law judge shall represent his independent judgment.
Sections 35-4-10(e) state the manner in which disputed matters are
presented...consolidation would not be prejudicial to any party.
Under these laws, Respondent denied Petitioner his rights.
Respondent states that the claims set forth in Petitioner's
Brief under Points III, IV and V are without merit in that there is
no evidence of a perjured witness. The facts are that Petitioner
provided ample evidence to support that fact.

The documentation

from the Bankruptcy Court wherein Cox stated under oath that
Petitioner was not an employee, commissioned or otherwise in direct
contravention to his testimony in the Respondent's hearing(s), that
Petitioner was an unsecured creditor; the fact that witness Cox did
not provide any legally-required proof of labor (W-2, 1099, etc.),
the letter of threat incorporated into Petitioner's Brief (Addendum
2); the fact that the witness reported the Petitioner to Job
Service, and provided whatever written documentation was requested
by Job Service after Petitioner's termination; the fact that the
witness was asked in Hearing Officer Warner's hearing whether he
owed Petitioner money and refused to pay, took out bankruptcy and
then turned petitioner in to Job Service to which he answered
"yes;" the fact there was controversial testimony wherein witness
Cox couldn't recall when Petitioner worked, or how many hours were
involved, admitted he really didn't know what the contract said as
to time to be worked or commission paid.

The only reliable

testimony was from Petitioner who stated he had not put in more
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than ten hours from May 1 to June 7 and that on his own time from
his home on his own residual accounts. Cox testified that three or
four months after the initiation of the contract he decided to pay
a

draw

which

would

have

been

at

the

earliest

in

August.

Notwithstanding, the ALJ decided that witness Cox was the more
believable

party

although

his

conclusions

were,

at

best,

inferential and speculative and not supported by a reasonable
burden of proof.
The board stated in its findings (R. 171) that "based on the
testimony of the claimant's employer" they affirmed the decision of
the ALJ.
The "ample evidence" without the benefit of testimony of Cox
or Warner noted by Respondent is singularly absent, the findings of
fact being amply supported by the exhibits of record and by
Petitioner's testimony is on its face incorrect. The exhibits were
meaningless without the Cox testimony and in fact supported
Petitioner's testimony.
a.

No transcript from Hearing Officer Warner's hearing nor

have his notes have been provided. His decision was based upon his
opinion which was obviously based upon his own investigation and
subsequently from untranscribed and therefore unknown testimony of
the related parties. Under the law, Utah Code Annotated, Sections
35-1-30 describe that a full and complete record shall be kept of
all proceedings

and

transcription, when

requested,

shall be

provided. Sections 35-4-10(e) state...all testimony at any hearing
upon

a disputed

matter

shall

be

14

reported

but

need

not be

transcribed unless the disputed matter is appealed.

Under Utah

Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 10 (e)(2) a transcription is
required

of

conclusion.

all

evidence

regarding

challenged

finding

or

If the appellant intends to urge on appeal that a

finding or conclusion is unsupported by or is contrary to the
evidence, the appellant shall include in the record a transcript of
all evidence relevant to such finding or conclusion.

Petitioner

requested the transcript (R. 177); however, none has been supplied,
therefore, it is concluded that no evidence exists for Hearing
Officer Warner's hearing, and as a consequence since the evidence
does not exist it cannot be included, relied upon, or refuted.
This is the only evidence upon which the subsequent hearings were
predicated.
b.

The evidence from ALJ Hynek's hearing has been well

covered and documented in Petitioner's brief and the numerous
errors in his assumptions, conclusions and misconduct have been
pointed out; in describing the elements of fraud, Utah Code
Annotated,

Sections

35-4-6-(d) which

are

fault, materiality,

control, and knowledge, ALJ Hynek's opinion was entirely based on
Hearing Officer Warner's findings and report and testimony (see "a"
above) and on Witness Cox's testimony.
willful

misrepresentation

or

Rule R562.5e-1 mandates a

concealment

of

information.

Willfulness/intentional misrepresentation were never alleged or
testified to and therefore were never established.

Under R562-5e-

3, the burden of proof is on the Respondent; it failed to prove its
case.

Under standards of proof, a preponderance of evidence must
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be relied upon in the absence of an admission; this evidence was
based upon the inimitable and incorrectly interpreted "contract,"
its interpretation
testimony of Cox.

by Cox and

the Respondent, and upon the

Neither Petitioner's attorney nor the hearing

officer nor the ALJ understood the facts and their conclusions were
based on faulty unreasonable assumptions and conjecture, not
evidence.

The Petitioner freely admitted he did not believe the

money he received was earnings for employment; he never had an
opportunity to fully explain why until he prepared his Affidavit
which was ignored in the review process.
c.

The Board of Review rubberstamped the ALJ's opinion

"supported by competent evidence;" the evidence upon which they
relied was from the hearing officer (see a), and Witness Cox; in
fact, the findings quote only Witness Cox.
dismissed

other

evidence provided

It then summarily

by petitioner

on

residual

commissions and stated the perpetual "if earned while working for
previous employer, commissions would have been due from previous
employer."

This conclusion is at variance with policy of the

department which does and has held that residual commissions are
due when earned not when paid.
Utah

Code Annotated,

Sections

decision of an administrative
independent judgment.

agency's

...each

law judge shall represent his

Sections 35-4-10(e) state the manner in

which disputed matters are presented.
the

35-4-10(c) charge

administrative

The Judicial Code charges

reviewers

responsibilities as more formal judges.

16

with

the

same

The agency reviewers

ignored the collateral cases on the one hand in Circuit Court and
on the other

in United

States Bankruptcy

Court wherein the

Petitioner was listed by the Respondent's complaining witness as an
unsecured creditor, not an employee of any type.
Respondent

states that Petitioner's charges that Hearing

Officer Warner's misconduct are without merit. Utah Code Annotated,
Sections 78-7-1(c) note that "except by consent of all parties, no
justice, judge, or justice court judge may sit or act in any action
or proceeding . . . (Petitioner certainly did not give its consent,
indeed objected at the hearing) when he has been attorney or
counsel for either party in the action or proceeding." Mr. Warner
was the departmental investigator and the judge in fact (whether
allegedly functioning as a departmental representative and not as
an independent hearings officer or not) on the first round, a
witness, a departmental representative (objected to by petitioner's
counsel and overruled) and an advocate at ALJ Hynek's hearing.
This action and activity are in contravention of law and would have
represented a mistrial in anything but a kangaroo court.

Warner

should have been disqualified, his findings stricken. Though he may
not have been the decision-maker in ALJ Hynek's hearing, he
certainly was an advocate for the department who crossexamined
witnesses and was a party to the off record discussions.

The

interlineation on his own testimony as a witness has been welldocumented in Petitioner's Brief.
Respondent states the collateral course cases had no bearing
on the current case.

In truth and in fact, under the law, the
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collateral findings of other courts are an integral part of the
case before the Court.
a. The complaining witness, assessed by the Respondent as the
employer, failed to designate the Petitioner as an employee,
however, characterized, in the Bankruptcy Court, stating under
oath, Petitioner was an unsecured creditor and discharging his debt
to him thereby.
b. The previous employer who had refused to pay Petitioner's
wages was brought to court in a collateral action; this action
resulted in the finding that petitioner was not an employee; the
effort in labor by Petitioner to acquire the clients under this
employment was never paid and was the product of labor designated
as residual accounts/commissions which Petitioner owned and for
which he was induced to accept loans by Cox in order that Cox could
acquire the future business needs and potential income from those
clients.
The effect of the Respondent's comment that the cases are not
material to the case at hand is to deny the presumed obligation of
a judge to reasonably honor and acknowledge findings by other
tribunals or courts of law.
CONCLUSION
The Court of Appeals should conclude that Petitioner's issues
for review are meritorious, that Respondent relied upon a witness
whose contemporaneous collateral actions impeached his testimony to
the extent that it should be stricken and totally disregarded.
Absent the tainted and inconsistent testimony of the complaining

18

witness, the only evidence is Petitioner's which is consistent with
exhibits entered by Respondent and affirmatively establish his
entitlement

to

"investigated"

benefits.
the

case

The
became

hearing
the

officer

initial

trier

who

first

of

fact,

simultaneously the advocate and witness on an appeal from his own
findings, from which no transcript exists.

This affront to

judicial propriety should shock the conscience of mankind.
Petitioner therefore respectfully requests this Court overturn
the Respondent's findings and order.
Respectfully submitted this 12th day of August, 1993.

Gary yi. Edwards
Attorney for Petitioner
Pro se
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APPENDIX A
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
Utah
Utah State Constitution
Article VI, Section 1,
All men have the inherent and inalienable right to enjoy and
defend their lives and liberties; to acquire, possess and
protect property;...protest against wrongs, and petition for
redress of grievances; to communicate freely their thoughts
and opinions, being responsible for the abuse of that right.
Article I, Section 7.
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property,
without due process of law.
Article I, Section 12.
...the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in
person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in
his own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against him,
to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of
witnesses in his own behalf...The accused shall not be
compelled to give evidence against himself...
Utah Code Annotated:
35-1-30.
A full and complete record shall be kept of all proceedings
before the commission on any investigation. Testimony shall
be recorded and may be transcribed when required by the
commission for further analysis, investigation, hearing, or
court proceedings. Transcription requested by any party to
the proceeding shall be provided at the requesting party's
expense.
35-4-2
As a guide to the interpretation and application of this act,
the public policy of this state is declared to be as follows:
Economic insecurity due to unemployment...Unemploymnet is
therefor a subject of general interest and concern...to
prevent its spread and to lighten its burden which now so
often falls with crushing force upon the unemployed worker and
his family...maintaining purchasing power and limiting the
serious social consequences of unemployment.
35-4-4(a)
He has made a claim for benefits with respect to that week in
accordance with any rules...
35-4-4(b)
He has registered for work at, and thereafter continued to
report at, an employment office...
35-4-4fc)
He is able to work and is available for work during each and
every week with respect to which he made a claim for benefits
under this chapter, and acted in good faith in an active
effort to secure employment...
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35-4-5(e)
Ineligibility of benefits.. .For each week with respect to
which the claimant willfully made a false statement or
representation or knowingly failed to report a material fact
to obtain any benefit under the provision of this chapter, and
an additional 13 weeks for the first week the statement or
representation was made or fact withheld
Determinations under this subsection shall be made only upon
a sworn written admission of the claimant or after due notice
and recorded hearing...
35-4-6(d)
Any person who, by reason of his fraud, has received any sum
as benefits to which he was not entitled shall be liable to
repay the sum...or shall, in the discretion of the commission,
be liable to have the sum deducted from any future benefits
payable to him...
35-4-10(c)
...Each decision of an administrative law judge shall
represent his independent judgment.
35-4-10(e)
The
manner
in
which
disputed
matters
are
presented...consolidation would not be prejudicial to any
party...All testimony at any hearing upon a disputed matter
shall be reported but need not be transcribed unless the
disputed matter is appealed.
35-4-17(b)(l)
Each employer shall furnish the commission such information as
is necessary for the proper administration
and shall include
wage information for each employee. ..
35-4-22(5) (A)
Whether the individual works his or her own schedule or is
required to comply with another person's instructions about
when, where, and how work is to be performed;
35-4-22(5)(G)
Whether the individual establishes his or her own time
schedule or does the employer set the time schedule.
35-4-22(5)(L)
Whether the individual is paid by the job or on a straight
commission or is paid by the employer in regular amounts at
stated intervals.
35-4-22(6)(S)
Unless services would constitute employment at common law,
"employment" does not include services as an outside salesman
paid solely by way of commission, if the services were
performed outside of all places of business of the enterprises
for which the services are performed.
35-4-22(7)
"Included and excluded service" means ...if all services
performed during more than one-half of any such pay period by
an individual for the person employing him do not constitute
employment then none of the services of the individual for the
period are considered to be employment.
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